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Abstract
We study the robustness of complex networks subject to edge removal. Several network models
and removing strategies are simulated. Rather than the existence of the giant component, we use
total connectedness as the criterion of breakdown. The network topologies are introduced a simple
traffic dynamics and the total connectedness is interpreted not only in the sense of topology but
also in the sense of function. We define the topological robustness and the functional robustness,
investigate their combined effect and compare their relative importance to each other. The results
of our study provide an alternative view of the overall robustness and highlight efficient ways to
improve the robustness of the network models.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Complex networks are ubiquitous in our world. They exhibit not only diverse structural
characteristics [1, 2], such as the power-law tail of degree distribution and the small-world
phenomenon of average path length, but also different levels of robustness, e.g., scale-free
networks display higher tolerance to error but more vulnerability to attack than exponential
networks [6, 7, 8, 9]. Robustness evaluates the ability of a network to maintain its original
attributes and functions when constituent loss or other kinds of damage are present. Once
the robustness is identified, the weakness of a network is pointed out for optimizations
or countermeasures, e.g., the weakness of a communication network can be overcome to
increase reliability, while the weakness of an epidemic network can be utilized for efficient
destruction. For these practical applications, the study of the robustness have received a lot
of interests.
Several measures of the robustness have been proposed. A frequently used one is the
existence of the giant component [6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. The giant component is the only component
in a network whose size scales linearly with the number of vertices. It was found that the
damage to a network, such as random removal of vertices or edges, can be exactly mapped
to a standard percolation process. The network percolates if the giant component exists,
indicating that the general connectedness of the network is maintained. There are also other
measures based on quantities such as efficiency [10, 15] and average path length [6, 10].
The measure we adopt in the present work is the preservation of total connectedness [13].
The total connectedness of a network is preserved only when communication is effective
between every pair of vertices in the network. The more damage needed to destroy the
total connectedness, the more robust the network is. This measure can be useful to describe
the robustness of networks that have no vertex redundancy. In such networks, each vertex
contributes to the whole in a way that cannot be replaced by the others and even the
unavailability of a single vertex affects the overall functionality, e.g., in a scenario that
many computers collaborate through a network to accomplish some calculation-intensive
task, if one or more members lose communication, the performance of the collaboration
may be degraded or the task may even fail. Note that the total connectedness used in the
measure is not limited within the sense of topology, i.e., physical connection is not the only
factor that influences the effectiveness of the communication; there are other factors that
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can hinder the communication even though all the vertices are connected. These factors
are often related to the function of a network, e.g., it was reported that in a transmission
network, a path connecting two vertices may become so long after damage that this path is
unusable [16]. As both topology and function related factors can prevent the communication
between vertices, two types of robustness are involved: the topological robustness and the
functional robustness. Studying their combined effect and the dominance of one over the
other can provide additional insights into the network robustness. However, such studies
have not yet been carried out extensively.
Besides the measures, the damage of constituent loss has also been widely studied in
the form of vertex removal. Removing a vertex is an appropriate abstraction of several real-
world events, e.g., a user leaves a P2P network, a website goes offline. There are other events
that should be abstracted more appropriately by removing an edge, e.g., a network cable is
unplugged, a flight between two cities is canceled. However, only a few works cover edge
removal. In fact, there are remarkable differences between the two types of removal. In the
sense of topology, vertex removal inflicts more damage, as each time a vertex is removed, all
of its edges are removed as well. Thus to achieve the same effect, smaller amount of vertices
is removed than edges. If the damage of removal is assessed in terms of edges rather than
vertices, the vulnerability of a network could be moderated [12]. In the sense of function,
the removal of vertices reduces the total amount of quantity transmitting on a network, as
vertices usually not only deliver but also generate the quantity. If the reduction of the total
amount can compensate the damage, the robustness of the network is enhanced [13]. On
the other hand, the enhancement may not be expected for edge removal because there is
no change in the total amount. These differences indicate that edge removal needs separate
studies from vertex removal.
In this paper, we propose to study the effect of edge removal on the topological robustness
and the functional robustness, using the total connectedness as the criterion of breakdown.
Several network topologies and removing strategies are simulated. We combine a simple
traffic dynamics with the network topologies and successively remove edges until the total
connectedness of the networks is destroyed. The fractions of removed edges characterize the
robustness of the networks. Moreover, as the destroy of the total connectedness is related
to either the topological factors or the functional factors, we see which type of the factors is
dominant. The purpose of our study is to explore the relationship between the topological
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robustness and the functional robustness, which is different from the purposes of previous
works that also deal with edge removal [18, 19, 20, 21, 22]. Particularly, we only concern
the times when the networks lose the total connectedness, and do not discuss the evolutions
thereafter, such as the occurrence of cascading failure [11]. The results of our study provide
an alternative view of the network robustness and highlight efficient ways for improvements.
The paper is organized as follows: In Sec. II, the model we studied is described in detail.
In Sec. III and IV, the simulation results are shown according to the removing strategies.
In Sec. V, we give the conclusion.
II. NETWORK TOPOLOGIES, ROBUSTNESS AND REMOVING STRATEGIES
The network models of topology we studied are the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER) model of random
network [1], the Baraba´si-Albert (BA) model of scale-free network [3] and the Newman-
Watts (NW) model [5], which is a variant of the Watts-Strogatz (WS) model of small-world
network [4]. For all the network models, we set vertex number N = 1024 and average degree
〈k〉 = 8. The edges are undirected and have no weight. Multiple edges are not allowed. In
order to study the robustness, we ensure that the topologies are totally connected when they
are intact. The ER model yields exponential degree distribution. Each vertex pair is linked
by an edge with probability 〈k〉/(N − 1). Since 〈k〉 > ln(N), the ER networks are almost
surely connected [1]. The BA model features growth and preferential attachment. At any
time step of a growth, the network from the previous step is connected. A new vertex is added
with 〈k〉/2 preferentially linked edges in the current step and the connectedness is preserved.
If a BA network grows infinitely large, the probability of a randomly selected vertex having
degree k is proportional to k−3. The NW model starts with a regular structure, which is
identical to the WS model. But unlike the WS model, the NW model builds shortcuts by
randomly inserting pN edges, where p is the rate of the shortcuts. This way of building
shortcuts eliminates the possible network fragment during the process of rewiring in the
WS model [5]. As total connectedness is the special concern, we adopted the NW model
instead of the WS model. With p changes from small to large, a NW network can undergo a
transition from “large world” to “small world”. We choose p = 0.02 in the small-world phase
without loss of generality. The pN shortcuts are inserted into a periodic square lattice with
side length L = 32 and coordination number z = 8. As p is a small quantity, the average
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degree is 8 + p ≈ 8. Among the three models, the BA model produces scale-free degree
distribution which is observed in many real networks [1]. The NW model is based on a
square lattice, which is the topology that can reproduce some of the observed real Internet
features [30]. The randomly inserted shortcuts are for the small-world property, though
high clustering is absent. The ER model does not match real networks in nearly all aspects.
Nevertheless, it has the significance that many of its properties can be obtained through
probabilistic approaches. Note that the average path lengths of all the three models scale
logarithmically with the number of vertices. It is interesting to compare the robustness of
them.
The robustness of the network models refers to the ability of maintaining total connected-
ness when a portion of edges are removed. The total connectedness is defined as the effective
communication between every pair of vertices, which is affected by the twofold effects of the
edge removal. One is that the physical connection between a pair of vertices may be cut
off. If the number of edges in a network is decimated to be less than N − 1, the network is
certainly not totally connected. The other effect is related to the fact that a network usually
performs some function, e.g., transmits some quantity. The edge removal may redistribute
the quantity transmitting on the network and the vertices may lose communication due to
congestion [14], e.g., the quantity from a source vertex is congested on some intermediate
vertices and never reaches the target. The former effect is topological, while the latter is
functional. Either of the two effects can destroy the total connectedness, and cause the
breakdown of the networks.
The topological breakdown of the networks occurs when the networks are just fragmented
from one component into two during the edge removal, i.e., at least one of the vertices is
isolated physically from the others [13]. This condition is more restrictive on the connectivity
than the existence of the giant component, which was usually used in previous works [6, 7,
8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. We adopt this condition in favor of the emphasis on the completeness of a
network and that the functional breakdown can be defined in a similar manner.
We incorporate a simple traffic dynamics to define the functional breakdown of the net-
works. At each time step, a certain amount ρ of quantity, which can be data, energy, etc., is
transmitted between every pair of vertices, along the shortest paths. Transmitting along the
shortest paths minimizes the delay of distributing the quantity. For the logarithmic average
path length of the network models, the transmission scales well. The number of shortest
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paths passing through a vertex j, which defines the vertex betweenness Bj of j [26], deter-
mines the load Lj of the transmitting quantity on j, Lj = ρBj [14]. The load is handled by
the vertex within its capacity, i.e., the amount of quantity that can pass through j is at most
the capacity of the vertex. It would be efficient to set the capacity of j proportional to Bj,
so as to meet the load. However, the calculation of betweenness needs global information
and takes time O (〈k〉N2) [23], which is resource consuming. For simplicity, we set uniform
capacity C for each vertex. As a result, the vertex with the largest betweenness Bmax is
the most likely to encounter overload. The largest generation rate ρc of the transmitting
quantity is C/Bmax. The rate ρc marks the capacities of the networks. It was found that
homogeneous networks have higher capacities than heterogeneous ones [14]. As the purpose
of the study is to compare the different aspects of the robustness rather than the absolute
capacities, we normalize ρ with respect to ρc for each individual network, i.e., the load of
j changes to Lj = ρBjC/Bmax, where ρ is the normalized generation rate of the quantity.
The load Lj is initially less than C with 0 < ρ < 1, but Lj could be larger than C as
the vertex betweenness redistributes in the process of edge removal. If removing an edge
leads to Lj > C for some vertex j, congestion occurs [14]. The excessive load accumulates
continuously on j and the vertex is unable to communicate with other vertices. Similar to
the topological breakdown, the total connectedness is destroyed. This situation defines the
functional breakdown of the networks. One can see that the functional breakdown actually
depends on the evolution of the ratio Bj/Bmax; the study of the functional robustness is
essentially a test of the response of vertex betweenness to edge perturbations. Though the
dynamics is simple, some essential functional properties of the networks are reflected and
we are able to study the relative importance of the functional robustness to the topological
robustness under different values of the only parameter ρ.
To study the two types of the robustness, we start from an undamaged network generated
by one of the network models and remove the edges one at a time until the network breaks
down for either the topological or the functional reasons. The robustness are studied in the
contexts of different removing strategies.
Two removing strategies are used: random failure and attack. The random failure strat-
egy removes edges with uniform probability, which can be seen as a simple abstraction of
the successive error in a communication network. The attack strategy removes edges in the
descending order of their importance, which tries to model a sophisticated attacker who
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knows the global information of a network and always targets the most important link.
There are several quantities that can define the importance of an edge, such as edge be-
tweenness and edge degree [10, 22]. We choose edge betweenness as the definition of the
importance, because betweenness directly measures the load of the transmitting quantity in
our traffic dynamics. Analogous to vertex betweenness, edge betweenness is defined as the
number of shortest paths passing through an edge [22]. Every time the most important edge
is removed, we recalculate the betweenness to find the most important one in the remain-
ing edges. If there are multiple edges having the same largest betweenness, we randomly
select one for removal. Random failure and attack are usually studied together to obtain a
collective characterization of network robustness [6]. In the next two sections, we show the
results according to the two strategies.
III. THE RANDOM FAILURE STRATEGY
In this section, edges are randomly removed from the networks. We first study the total
breakdown, which is the combined effect of the topological breakdown and the functional
breakdown. Figure 1 shows the cumulative distribution function CDFtotal of the total break-
down as a function of the fraction f of removed edges for the network models. The results
are shown for different values of ρ.
When ρ = 0, there is no quantity transmitting on the networks. The total breakdown
is in fact the topological breakdown, which is characterized by a critical fraction f topoc of
removed edges. When f < f topoc , each of the networks is totally connected; when f ≥ f
topo
c ,
each of the networks is split into two or more components, where one of the components
could be the giant component.
For the ER model, almost every model realization is connected if 〈k〉 > ln(N) [1]. Thus
f topoc = [〈k〉 − ln(N)] /〈k〉.
For the BA model, a simple estimate of fc is sought under the framework of random
graph with prescribed degree sequence [29]. Seeing that the BA model yields no assortative
mixing [28], i.e., no degree correlation, we equate the BA networks to random scale-free
networks. Although the BA model features network assembly and evolution instead of
complete randomness, some qualitative result can be obtained by the estimate and confirmed
through simulation. For a random network with arbitrary degree distribution P (k), the
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FIG. 1: The cumulative distribution function CDFtotal of the total breakdown under the random
failure strategy as a function of the fraction f of removed edges for (a) the ER model, (b) the
BA model and (c) the NW model. When ρ = 0, the total breakdown is in fact the topological
breakdown; when ρ > 0, the total breakdown is the combined effect of the topological breakdown
and the functional breakdown. All the data is averaged over 10240 realizations.
probability pis of a randomly selected vertex being in a finite component of size s has been
obtained in Ref. [27],
pis =
〈k〉
(s− 1)!
[
ds−2
dzs−2
[g1(z)]
s
]
z=0
, (1)
where g1(z) =
∑∞
k=0
(k+1)P (k+1)
〈k〉
zk and s > 1. Particularly, pi1 = P (0). We now consider a
scale-free random network, which has the same N , 〈k〉 and P (k) as the BA networks. With
8
the minimum degree larger than 2, g1(z) has no constant terms and pis = 0. There are no
finite components, all the vertices are connected in the giant component. It was reported
that the giant component always exists for a random network with P (k) ∼ k−3 when vertices
are randomly removed [7]. The result is similar if edges are removed [12]. Thus the network is
always split into the giant component and a finite component. Denote pis(f) the distribution
of the size of the finite component after a fraction f of edges are removed. When f → 0, the
network is nearly not affected and pis(f) → 0. Though pis(f) is small, various sizes of the
finite components are probable. With the existence of the giant component, pis(f) ≈ pis(0)
decays exponentially [27]. We then neglect the higher order components and focus only
on the components of size one and two. The new degree distribution and the new average
degree after edge removal are Pf(k) =
∑∞
k0=k
P (k0)
(
k0
k
)
(1− f)kfk0−k and 〈k〉f = (1− f)〈k〉,
respectively [7]. We calculate the ratio
r(f) =
pi2(f)
pi1(f)
=
[Pf(1)]
2
〈k〉fPf(0)
=
(1− f)
[∑∞
k=1 kP (k)f
k
]2
f 2〈k〉
∑∞
k=1 P (k)f
k
. (2)
This ratio is a monotonically decreasing function of f , which implies that in addition to
the exponential decay of pis(f) when f → 0, the components of size two become even less
probable than the components of size one as f becomes larger; in most cases, the network
is split into the giant component and a finite component consisting of an isolated vertex.
In the simulation of the BA model, we observed that in more than 99.8% realizations, the
finite component is of size one. This fact allows us to estimate the critical fraction f topoc
by the emergence of an isolated vertex, which has empty degree. If one such vertex can be
sampled, the total connectedness is destroyed, i.e., f topoc satisfies Pfctopo(0) =
1
N
.
For the NW model, the critical fraction f topoc is obtained in a similar manner. Employing
the expression of pis(f) [27], we get
pis(f) =
(1− f)s−1〈k〉
(s− 1)!
[
ds−2
dzs−2
[
z7
]s]
z=f
=
(7s)!〈k〉f 6s+2(1− f)s−1
(s− 1)!(6s+ 2)!
, (3)
where the shortcuts in the model are neglected for convenience and the original degree
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FIG. 2: The scaling relation between Pf (0) and 1/N at f = f
topo
c for the BA model and the NW
model when edges are randomly removed. Symbols are the results of simulation, each of which is
an average over 102400 networks. The two solid lines (They nearly overlap.) are the linear fits of
the simulation results. The slopes of the lines are 0.991 and 0.980.
distribution reads P (k0) = δ(k0 − 8). When s is large,
pis(f)
pis−1(f)
≈
77
66
(1− f)f 6. (4)
This ratio tends to zero when f → 0 and increases monotonically until it reaches the
maximum value 1 at f = fc =
6
7
, where fc is the critical percolation fraction [7]. As
the total connectedness is more restrictive than the existence of the giant component, we
claim that 0 < f topoc < fc. In this region, pis(f
topo
c ) drops exponentially, and again, each of
the NW networks is split into the giant component and an isolated vertex, f topoc satisfies
Pfctopo(0) =
1
N
. Particularly, we get f topoc ∼ N
− 1
8 for the NW model. The result is consistent
that if N →∞, then f topoc → 0 and pis(f
topo
c ) decays very quickly with increasing s. In Fig. 2,
we plotted the scaling relation between Pf topoc (0) and 1/N obtained in the simulation for the
BA model and the NW model. As the figure shows, the agreement between the theoretical
estimate and the simulation is reasonable. The above calculations show that f topoc is strongly
correlated to the local connectivity of vertices. In the BA model, the majority of the vertices
have degree four, while in the NW model, all the vertices have degree at least eight. Thus
as Fig. 1 shows, the NW model is more topologically robust than the BA model and they
both are more topologically robust than the ER model.
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When ρ > 0, the functional breakdown can also happen. Intuitively, networks with
larger ρ are more functionally vulnerable. We showed in Fig. 1 the cumulative distribution
function of the total breakdown only for near capacity generation rates. When ρ = 0.95,
the ER networks are very likely to break down when only a small fraction of edges are
removed. For the same ρ, the NW model has slightly larger CDFtotal than the BA model,
which suggests that while the NW model is more topologically robust than the BA model, it
is less functionally robust. Note in the figure that while CDFtotal for large ρ increases fast in
the region 0 < f < 0.1 for all the network models, CDFtotal for ρ = 0 increases much slower
for the ER model or remains nearly zero for the BA model and the NW model. Thus in this
region of f , the total breakdown is mainly determined by the functional breakdown. With ρ
close to 1, the functional breakdown reflects the change in the network capacity during the
edge removal. In Fig. 3, we plotted the average network capacity 〈ρc〉f as a function of f for
the network models. (〈ρc〉f is normalized to the initial value 〈ρc〉0.) The capacity of all the
network models decreases with the edge removal, because the shortest paths concentrate on
the remaining edges and the betweenness of vertices becomes more heterogeneous.
For the ER networks, the degree distribution remains exponential when edges are ran-
domly removed, i.e., the ER networks are still ER networks after the edge removal. The
vertex betweenness B of ER networks has a power-law relation B ∼ kα with degree k [24],
hence
〈ρc〉f =
C
Bmax(f)
=
C∑
j Bj(f)
[kmax(f)]
α∑
k
kα
=
C∑
j Bj(f)
(1+α)[kmax(f)]α
[kmax(f)]α+1−1
≈
Ckmax(f)∑
j Bj(f)(1 + α)
, (5)
where Bmax(f) is the maximum vertex betweenness and kmax(f) is the maximum degree
when a fraction f of edges are removed. The vertex betweenness also satisfies
∑
j Bj(f) =
DN(N − 1), where D ∼ ln(N)/ ln(〈k〉f) is the average path length [1]. Then we get
〈ρc〉f ∼
Ckmax(f) ln (〈k〉f)
(1 + α)N(N − 1) ln(N)
(6)
and the normalized average capacity
〈ρc〉f
〈ρc〉0
∼ kmax(f) ln[〈k〉(1− f)] = F (f), (7)
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FIG. 3: The normalized average capacity 〈ρc〉f / 〈ρc〉0 under the random failure strategy as a
function of the fraction f of removed edges for the network models. The inset shows the linear
relation between 〈ρc〉f / 〈ρc〉0 and F (f) for the ER model, where F (f) = kmax(f) ln[〈k〉 (1 − f)].
All the data is averaged over 10240 realizations. The line in the inset is the linear fit.
where kmax(f) and f have an implicit relation [2] through the regularized gamma function
P (α, x) that P [⌊kmax(f) + 1⌋ , (1− f)〈k〉] =
1
N
. The linear relation between 〈ρc〉f / 〈ρc〉0
and F (f) is also shown in Fig. 3. The average network capacity of the ER model decreases
much more quickly than those of the other two network models, thus the ER model has the
worst functional robustness.
For the BA model, though there is a similar power-law relation B ∼ kη in scale-free net-
works [25], scale-free degree distribution does not remain scale-free when edges are randomly
removed [20]. Instead, we compare the trend of the the load distribution for the BA model
and the NW model. The two network models both have heterogeneous load distributions.
Hub vertices or shortcuts carry large load. The BA model also has heterogeneous connec-
tivity while the NW model has homogeneous connectivity. When each edge is removed with
equal probability, the hub vertices in the BA networks are more likely to be diminished than
the non-hub vertices, while the shortcuts in the NW model are not biased. The BA net-
works tend to have more homogeneous load distribution than the NW networks. As shown
in Fig. 3, the average capacity of the BA networks decreases slightly slower than that of the
NW networks. The BA networks are a little more functionally robust.
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FIG. 4: The occurrence probability Ptopo of the topological breakdown under the random failure
strategy as a function of the normalized generation rate ρ for the network models. The data is
averaged over 10240 realizations. The dashed line is for Ptopo = 50%. The network model that
corresponds to the smallest ρ at the point of intersection between Ptopo and this line has the best
relative topological robustness.
After studying the combined effect, we compare the dominance of the topological break-
down and the functional breakdown. During the simulation, we measure the occurrence
probability Ptopo of the topological breakdown. If this probability is larger than 50%, the
topological breakdown is dominant, otherwise the functional breakdown is dominant. As a
supplement to the absolute robustness studied above, the dominance is a sign of the rela-
tive robustness, i.e., which breakdown is less likely to happen than the other. The result is
shown in Fig. 4 as a function of ρ. For all the network models, the topological breakdown is
dominant when ρ is small, and the functional breakdown is dominant when ρ is close to 1.
There is a shift in the dominance, which corresponds to a particular value of ρ. The smaller
this value is, the better relative topological robustness a network model has. As the figure
shows, the NW model has the best relative topological robustness as well as the best abso-
lute topological robustness, and the BA model has the best relative functional robustness as
well as the best absolute functional robustness. Though the ER model has both the worst
absolute robustnesses, its relative robustness is intermediate.
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IV. THE ATTACK STRATEGY
In this section, edges are removed in the descending order of their betweennesses. For
the sake of clarity, we first show the results for the ER model and the BA model, and then
for the NW model. We study the same quantities as in the previous section.
The cumulative distribution function CDFtotal of the total breakdown was plotted as a
function of f in Fig. 5 for the ER model and the BA model. We first discuss the topological
robustness, which corresponds to ρ = 0. The ER networks are very vulnerable to attack, the
removal of only 0.5% edges almost surely destroys the total connectedness. The vulnerability
is due to the lack of loops. With nearly no loops [1], the ER networks can be roughly seen as
trees, i.e., there is only one self-avoiding path connecting a pair of vertices. The only path is
at the same time the shortest path. Many shortest paths concentrate on the high betweenness
edges, which are removed by the attacker with high priority. The loss of the edges prevents
communication between vertex pairs easily, as there are no alternative paths. On the other
hand, the BA networks are much more robust, they can afford the removal of nearly half of
the edges before almost surely break down. There is a strong correlation [10] in BA networks
that CB(e) ∼ ke, where CB(e) is the betweenness of an edge e and ke is the product of the
degrees of the two vertices connected by the edge. This correlation implies that at the early
stage of the attack, when the characteristics of the networks are not affected too much,
only the edges between vertices with large degree are targeted. The removal of these edges
generally does not destroy the total connectedness and the BA networks can be reduced up
to tree-like. The topological robustness of the ER model and the BA model has been studied
by examining the size of the largest component in Ref. [10]. The authors focused on the
effects of various attack strategies. Here we examine the total connectedness and provide
explanations for the effects of the specific strategy. Moreover, the topological robustness is
compared with the functional robustness. As shown in the figure, plots corresponding to
empty load and high load almost overlap for both of the network models, indicating that
the functional breakdown hardly occurs. We then investigate the average network capacity.
The normalized average capacity 〈ρc〉f / 〈ρc〉0 was plotted as a function of f in Fig. 6 for
the ER model and the BA model. When the edge with the highest betweenness is attacked,
the shortest paths that originally pass through the edge take detours. The highest edge
betweenness is dispersed and the network capacity is increased. This is the case for both
14
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FIG. 5: The cumulative distribution function CDFtotal of the total breakdown under the attack
strategy as a function of the fraction f of removed edges for (a) the ER model and (b) the BA
model. All the data is averaged over 10240 realizations. The plots corresponding to empty load
and high load almost overlap for both of the network models.
of the network models. The capacity of the ER networks monotonically increases during
the whole process, indicating that the networks are free of the functional breakdown. The
capacity of the BA networks keeps increasing until a certain value of f , after which the
shortest paths revert to collect on the remaining edges and the capacity is decreased. As
shown in the figure, the capacity is boosted up to nearly 8 times as the initial value at
f = 0.35 and then drops. We observed in the simulation that only in few realizations
does the capacity drop below the initial value, thus the BA networks are almost free of
the functional breakdown. Note that the growth and decay of the capacity was studied in
Ref. [18] with the purpose of finding the optimum transmission efficiency. At each time
step, the author chose to remove the edge with the largest weight, which is the product
of the betweennesses of the two vertices an edge connects, and intentionally avoided the
disintegration of network. Though there are some variations in the models, our result is
qualitatively no different.
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FIG. 6: The normalized average capacity 〈ρc〉f / 〈ρc〉0 under the attack strategy as a function of
the fraction f of removed edges for (a) the ER model and (b) the BA model. All the data is
averaged over 10240 realizations.
An interesting point worthy of note is that the attack strategy does not fulfill its name for
the BA model. By comparing Fig. 5(b) with Fig. 1(b), we find that the BA model is more
robust under the attack strategy than under the random failure strategy for any value of ρ.
This result coincides with the moderated vulnerability of networks in terms of edge [12] and
is in contrast to the higher vulnerability of the BA model under vertex attack than error
when the existence of the giant component is used as the criterion of breakdown [6].
The cumulative distribution function CDFtotal of the total breakdown and the normalized
average capacity 〈ρc〉f / 〈ρc〉0 are shown as functions of f for the NW model in Fig. 7. The
figure can be interpreted as follows: Starting from a complete NW network, the attacker first
targets the shortcuts, because they collect the most shortest paths. After all the shortcuts
are removed, the rest of the network is a two dimensional L × L periodic lattice with each
vertex connected to its neighbors and next neighbors. The structure becomes completely
homogeneous and the network capacity is boosted. Thus we see the first peak of the network
capacity at f = f1 = 2p/〈k〉 = 0.005 in Fig. 7(b). The attacker continues by randomly
targeting an edge. We show a diagram in Fig. 8(a) to help the interpretation. The lattice is
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put on a x-y plane and Fig. 8(a) shows a slice along the x direction. For every edge in the
figure, there are L − 1 parallel counterparts in the y direction. The L edges form a group
that if any edge in the group is removed, the others are removed in the next few steps as
well, because shortest paths that originally pass through the whole group concentrate on the
remaining members, raising the betweennesses of them. Suppose that edge e1 in the figure
is removed, the network capacity drops until all the counterparts of the edge are removed.
The heterogeneity of the raised betweenness is alleviated and we see the second peak of the
network capacity, which is L edges away from the first peak. However, the capacity is not
fully restored, as edge e2, e3 and their counterparts collect larger number of shortest paths
than before. Thus two peaks follow, each at an interval of L edges. With the 3L edges gone,
the lattice is no longer periodic and the center area in the x direction collects the highest
betweenness. Then the following attack removes another 3L edges in this area and the
network is split. For the most of the model realizations, six peaks of the network capacity
are observed, which conforms to the arguments above. There is a special case that allows
the observation of one more peak. As depicted in Fig. 8(b), it is possible that a shortcut e4
is placed between vertex a and b. This kind of shortcut spans less lattice distance than the
abundant next-neighbor links, thus collects less shortest paths and is removed very late in
the attack. The existence of such shortcut brings higher betweenness to a group of L edges
in the y direction, e.g., all the shortest paths passing through a and c collect on the edge e6
in the figure. Removing this group of edges induces the seventh peak. The seven peaks are
pointed out in Fig. 7(b) by arrows. We see in the figure that the network capacities on the
peaks are larger than the initial value, thus only when the capacities in the valleys drop below
the initial value does the network functionally break down, i.e., CDFtotal shown in Fig. 7(a)
resembles stairs for ρ 6= 0. When ρ = 0.95, nearly 90% model realizations functionally
break down before f = 0.005. The situation is only a little better than the ER model and
much worse than the BA model. For the topological case ρ = 0, there is a plateau in the
figure which corresponds to the emergence of the seventh peak. We estimate the emergence
probability as
(
pN
1
)
Psc (1− Psc)
pN−1 ≈ 7.3%, where Psc =
4
N−8
is the probability of the
occurrence of the special shortcut and we only consider the first order of this probability.
The result is supported by Fig. 7 that the topological breakdown takes place just before the
seventh peak of the network capacity, at f = f7 = f1 + 6L/(〈k〉N/2) = 0.0519, for about
92.7% model realizations. The topological breakdown for the rest of the model realizations
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FIG. 7: The simulation results of the attack strategy for the NW model: (a) The cumulative
distribution function CDFtotal of the total breakdown as a function of the fraction f of removed
edges for different values of the normalized generation rate ρ; (b) The normalized average capacity
〈ρc〉f / 〈ρc〉0 as a function of f . All the data is averaged over 10240 realizations. The arrows point
out the seven peaks of the network capacity. The dashed lines are guides to the eye: the topological
breakdown (ρ = 0) takes place just before the seventh peak for about 92.7% model realizations.
takes place after L more edges are removed. The NW model has intermediate topological
robustness between the ER model and the BA model.
The relative robustness of the network models for the attack strategy is studied in the
same way as in the previous section for the random failure strategy. The result is shown
in Fig. 9. The ER model has the worst absolute topological robustness, and also the worst
relative topological robustness, as for any value of ρ, no functional breakdown takes place.
While the BA model has the best absolute topological robustness, the relative topological
robustness is still bad, nearly the same as the ER model. For the NW model, we know that
the topological breakdown only takes place when at least 6L edges are removed, but the
functional breakdown could happen if network capacity drops below the initial value. The
figure shows that for ρ > 0.2, the topological breakdown hardly takes place. Thus the NW
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FIG. 8: A NW network after all the shortcuts are removed, which is a two dimensional periodic
lattice with coordination number 8, is put on a x-y plane. Both the arcs and lines represent edges,
and the circles represent vertices. (a) A slice of the lattice in the x direction is shown. Every edge
in the complete lattice has equal betweenness. If e1 is removed, the shortest paths going from the
left-hand side to the right-hand side have fewer choices of edge than before. Thus e2 and e3 collect
larger betweenness than the others and are the immediate targets in the following attack. Note that
e1, e2 and e3 each represent a group of L edges in the y direction. (b) The edge e4 is such a special
shortcut that it spans less lattice distance than the next-neighbor links and collects fewer shortest
paths. Though the betweenness of the shortcut is low, the betweennesses of the neighboring edges
are increased, e.g., the shortest paths connecting a, c and a, d both pass through b, the edges e5
and e6 are biased. Different from e6, the edge e5 is in the y direction. In addition to the six peaks
in the x direction, one more peak of the network capacity could be seen. In fact the effect of the
shortcut e4 is weak that the counterpart of e5 which connects to a in the y direction is not removed
before the lattice is split. For clarity, some next-neighbor links are omitted.
model has the best relative topological robustness.
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FIG. 9: The occurrence probability Ptopo of the topological breakdown under the attack strategy as
a function of the normalized generation rate ρ for the network models. The data is averaged over
10240 realizations. The dashed line is for Ptopo = 50%. The network model that corresponds to the
smallest ρ at the point of intersection between Ptopo and this line has the best relative topological
robustness.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the topological robustness and the functional robustness of
several network models under two strategies of edge removal, using the total connectedness
as the measure. For each removing strategy, we have examined the combined effect and the
relative importance of the two types of robustness. Through the study of the combined effect,
we have found out the network topology which is the most robust in a specific environment,
e.g., the NW model is the most robust in the environment of the random edge removal, while
the BA model is the most robust in the environment of the edge attack. Through the study
of the relative importance, we have known with evidence how to strengthen a network effi-
ciently, e.g., as the NW model has the best relative topological robustness, improvements on
the functional robustness should be emphasized, such as increasing the capacity of vertices;
the BA model has bad relative topological robustness under the edge attack, thus enhance-
ments on the connectivity such as building redundant links are appropriate. These results
can have applications in designing and optimizing artificial networks, such as implementing
a robust P2P network where a connection between peers has a constant probability to fail.
There are also some extensions for further studies. The traffic dynamics in our model is far
20
from realistic, more elements abstracted from real-world traffic can be incorporated. More-
over, networks are not limited to carrying traffic. It is an open question how the interaction
between the topologies and different dynamics influences the network robustness.
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